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Mental Health
The Bournewood Fright
The recent House of Lords case of 
R v Bournewood Mental Health Trust, 
ex pane L [1998] 3 WLR 107-128 has, to 
a large extent, settled grave concerns 
amongst those responsible for the care 
and treatment of mentally disordered 
people, including mental health trusts, 
mental health charities, the Mental 
Health Act Commission, the Royal 
Society of Psychiatrists, the Department 
of Health, and proprietors of residential 
and nursing care homes, which arose 
after the Court of Appeal decision in the 
same matter ([1998] 2 WLR 764).
This case illustrates the finer aspects ol 
the intermeshing of statute law with 
common law and also how easy it is to 
spend time 'reinventing the wheel' when 
the issues being strained at have already 
been thought out by earlier generations.
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Another example of this is the constant 
and revolving argument about the welfare 
principle in the law applying to children.
The principle can be shortly stated: that 
the welfare of children is of paramount 
importance. It is the first consideration in 
any decision concerning children. In 
practice, this tends to mean that the court 
tries to achieve the best interests of the 
child in the circumstances. This has been 
so stated constantly from the last century. 
Successive generations of practitioners 
seek constantly to restate it as some lorm 
of new insight but, as with many basic 
principles of our civilisation, the principle 
is more or less immutable until such time 
as the basis of our civilisation changes.
The question of if, when, and whether 
a person who lacks mental capacity can 
give, or does give, consent to nursing care 
and treatment is not one of these great 
immutable principles, but it had been 
thoroughly thought out during the 1950s
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before the Court of Appeal grappled with 
the issue. This seems to have escaped 
notice until it was explained to the House 
of Lords in June 1998.
BOURNEWOOD: THE FACTS
The 4 8-year old applicant is autistic 
with learning disabilities. He is liable to
o
self-injury and agitation. He is incapable
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of indicating consent to medical 
treatment.
He was in residential care with 
Bournewood Community and Mental 
Health NHS Trust and its predecessor 
authorities for 37 years, before being 
placed with carers in the community in 
1994 (presumably pursuant to the NHS 
and Community Care Act 1993), as he 
remained the responsibility ol the Trust.
In 1997 there was an episode of 
agitation and self-harm at his day centre 
His carers could not be contacted and the 
responsible social worker arranged for 
him to go to the local casualty' 
department. It was decided there that he 
should be re-admitted to the behavioural 
unit of his old long-stay hospital for his 
condition to be stabilised. He was 
admitted to an unlocked ward as an 
informal patient because he was not 
showing any wish to leave hospital. If he 
had wanted to leave hospital and was 
being non-compliant with nursing care 
he would have been compulsorily 
detained under s. 3 of the Mental Health 
Act 1983. His carers in the community 
took the view that he was being 
unlawfully detained and an application 
was made in the High Court on his behalf 
for judicial review, an order of habeas 
corpus ad subjudiciendum and damages lor 
false imprisonment and assault.
The judge, at first instance, held that, 
whilst the Mental Health Act 1983 covered 
all aspects of formally detained mental 
patients, s. 131(1) of the Act preserved 
the common law jurisdiction in respect 
of informal patients. Since the applicant 
had been informally admitted, and the 
elements of the common law principle of 
necessity had been established, the 
applicant had not been unlawfully 
detained.
The applicant appealed to the Court of 
Appeal which found that s. 1 31 (1) of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 was only 
concerned with those patients who could 
indicate consent to intormal admission 
and so, as this applicant was too disabled 
to articulate consent, his admission 
amounted to an unlawful detention. The
Trust therefore detained the patient 
under s. 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 
belore ultimately discharging him back to 
his carers in the community.
This decision at once raised concern 
around the country amongst those 
responsible for the care of compliant 
patients who lacked mental capacity, as it 
meant that unless they were all formally 
admitted to their caring institutions 
under s. 2 5 of the Mental Health Act 
1983 those institutions would be acting 
unlawfully. The implications of this for 
resource allocation are outlined below.
The Trust appealed from the Court of 
Appeal decision to the House of Lords, 
which decided that the appeal should be 
allowed:
'... Parliament, in enacting the Menial 
Health Act 1983, had recognised that 
persons suffering from mental disorder who 
were treatedJor their condition as in-patients 
in hospital Jell into two categories, those who 
were compulsorily and formally admitted 
regardless of their will under sections 2 to 5 of 
the Act, and those who were informally- 
admitted under section 131(1) of the Act; 
that section 131(1) was in identical terms to, 
and was to be construed in the same way as, 
section 5(1) of the Mental Health Act 1959, 
which had allowed the informal admission of 
both consenting patients and those who, 
without the capacity to consent, had not 
manifested any objection, and the basis upon 
which a hospital was entitled to care Jor and 
treat such compliant incapacitated patients 
was the common law doctrine of necessity; that 
although the taking of the applicant to 
hospital could be said to have been a 
detention in the sense that, in the absence of 
justification, the tort of false imprisonment 
would have been committed, the decision that 
he should remain in hospital after readmission 
under section 131(1) did not (Lord Nolan 
and Lord Steyn dissenting) amount to an 
actual detention, since he had been placed in 
an unlocked ward and the possibility of laivful 
restraint had he sought to leave had not given 
rise to his detention in fact at any earlier 
date; that since all steps taken had been done 
in accordance with the trust's duty of care to 
the applicant and in his best interests, to the 21
extent that the applicant had been detained 
such detention had been justified by the
common law doctrine of necessity; and that,j *> '
accordingly, the tort of false imprisonment had 
not been committed against the applicant' 
([1998] 3 WLR 108).
The Court of Appeal had taken a 
different approach to the definition of 
detention. It held that L had been 
detained:
'In our judgment a person is detained in 
law if those who have control over the premises 
in which he is have the intention that he shall 
not be permitted to leave those premises and 
have the ability to prevent him from leaving. 
We have concluded that this was and is the 
position o/7..' ([1998J 2 WLR 764, at 
p. 769)
The Court of Appeal concluded that 
the Mental Health Act 1983 effected a 
'complete regime' which excluded the 
common law doctrine of necessity.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
JUDGMENT
Thousands of people receiving 
treatment would now have to be detained 
under s. 2-5, Mental Health Act 1983. 
While the average number of detained 
patients resident on any one day in 
England and Wales is approximately 
13,000, the Mental Health Act 
Commission estimated:
'there will be an additional 22,000 
detained patients resident on any one day as a 
consequence of the Court of Appeal judgment 
plus an additional 48,000 admissions per 
year under the Act.' ([1998] 3 WLR 112)
In the view of the Mental Health Act 
Commission, the majority ol the patients 
to whom the Court of Appeal decision 
applied were long-stay patients and it 
considered that if the Court of Appeal 
judgment held then the judgment would 
also apply to patients receiving medical 
treatment for mental disorder in mental 
nursing homes not registered to receive 
detained patients, and the above 
estimates were likely to be very much 
higher.
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There were resource implications for 
the mental health services, and 
professionals, responsible for 
implementing the Mental Health Act 1983, 
but also for the administration of Mental 
Health Tribunals, and the Mental Health 
Act Commission. Apart from resource 
implications, the impact on patients,
their relatives and carers had to be 
considered.
The President of the Royal Society of 
Psychiatrists, the Chairman of the Faculty' 
for Psychiatry and Old Age of the Royal 
Society1 of Psychiatrists, the Executive 
Director of the Alzheimer's Disease 
Society all expressed concern about the 
effect of the judgment.
The Mental Health Act Commission 
raised the question of whether mental 
nursing homes now had to be registered 
to receive patients detained under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 before receiving 
residents like L. The question arose as to 
whether unregistered homes had to 
discharge patients like L from their care.
The question also arose as to the legal 
status of the many thousands of elderly 
people in nursing or residential homes, 
receiving respite care and temporary 
care, who lack the capacity to consent to 
treatment.
SECTION 131(1), MENTAL 
HEALTH ACT 1983
Patients receiving treatment in a 
mental hospital fall into two legal 
categories:
(1) Those patients who are admitted to 
hospital under s. 2 5, Mental Health 
Act 1983. They have been 
compulsorily and formally admitted 
to hospital for assessment/treatment 
which can only be provided in 
hospital and it is necessary for the 
health or safety of the patient or for 
the protection of others. This is 
usually against the wishes of the 
patients to varying degrees at the 
time.
(2) Those patients who enter hospital as 
in-patients for treatment by consent 
and those patients who do not have 
the capacity to consent, or indicate 
consent, but do not express, by any 
means, any objections to admission. 
These patients are admitted under 
s. 131(1) Mental Health Act 1983 
without the formalities (and 
therefore legal protection) of s. 2 5.
This section is drafted in identical 
terms to s. 5(1) of the Mental Health Act 
1959. The 1959 Act was drafted in the 
light of the Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Law Relating to 
Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency 
1954-1957 (1957) (Cmnd 169) 9, 'the
Percy Commission'). Pages 100 101, at 
para. 289, 290 and 291, of the report are 
quoted in the House of Lords judgment 
at p. 114:
'We consider compulsion and detention 
quite unnecessary for a large number, 
probably the great majority, of the patients at 
present cared for in mental deficiency 
hospitals, most of whom are childlike and 
prepared to accept whatever arrangements are 
made for them. There is no need to have 
power to detain these patients in hospital 
rather than in their own homes or any other 
place which they have no wish to leave. We 
strongly recommend that the principle of 
treatment without certification should be 
extended to them. Such a step should help to 
alter the whole atmosphere of this branch of 
the mental health sen'ices. Many parents of 
such severely sub-normal children at present 
feel that they lose all their rights as parents 
when the child is admitted to hospital and 
automatically becomes subject to compulsory 
detention there. We have no doubt that the 
element of coercion also increases the 
resentment of some feebleminded psychopaths, 
and of their parents, when they are placed 
under 'statutory supervision' or admitted to 
mental deficiency hospitals after leaving 
school, and that this makes it even more 
difficult than it need be to persuade them to 
regard these services in the same way as other 
social services and other types of hospital 
treatment, as services which are provided for 
their own benefit. Equally important, if the 
procedures which authorise detention become 
the exception rather than the rule, the 
attitude towards compulsion on the part of 
those administering the service should change. 
These procedures will no longer be a formality 
which must be gone through before any 
patient can be given the care he needs. It will 
be possible to consider the need for care and 
the justification for compulsion as two quite 
separate questions in a way which is not 
possible at present.
Admission to hospital without using 
compulsory powers should also be possible for 
considerably more mentally ill patients than 
are at present admitted as voluntary patients.
We therefore recommend that the law and 
its administration should be altered, in 
relation to all forms of mental disorder, by 
abandoning the assumption that compulsory 
powers must be used unless the patient can 
express a positive desire for treatment, and 
replacing this by offer of care, without 
deprivation of liberty, to all who need it and 
are not unwilling to receive it. All hospitals 
providing psychiatric treatment should be free
to admit patients for any length of time 
without any legalformality and without power 
to detain.'
After quoting the above, Lord Goff 
then goes on to state (at p. 115 of his 
judgment):
'Here wejind a central recommendation of 
the Percy commission, and the mischiej it was 
designed to cure. This recommendation was 
implemented, in particular, by section 5(1) of 
the Act of 1959. That the Bill was introduced 
with that recommendation is confirmed by 
ministerial statements made in Parliament at 
the time: see Hansard (HL Debates, 4 June 
1959, cols. 668 and 669).
Following the enactment of the Act of 
1959, section 5(1) was duly implemented in 
the manner foreshadowed by the Percy 
commission, a practice which (as is plain from 
the evidence before the committee) has been 
continued under section 131(1) of the Act of
1 983, which is in identical terms. It is little 
wonder therefore that the judgment of the 
Court oj Appeal in the present case, which 
restricts section 131(1) to voluntary patients, 
should have caused the grave concern which 
has been expressed in the evidence, both (1) 
about the need, following the Court of 
Appeal's judgment, to invoke the power of 
compulsory detention in many cases, 
numbered in their thousands each year, which 
jor nearly 40years had not been necessary 
and would, on the view expressed by the Percy 
commission, be wholly inappropriate, and (2) 
about doubts whether some categories oj 
patients would or would not, in consequence 
of the judgment, require compulsoiy 
detention.'
At p. 1 16 of his judgment Lord Goff 
states:
7 am unable with all respect to accept the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal on the crucial
question of the meaning of section 131(1). 
I wish to stress, however, that the statutory 
histoty of the subsection, which puts the 
matter beyond all doubt, appears not to have 
been drawn to the attention of the Court of 
Appeal ..."
It seems that not only had this issue 
been fully thought through in the early 
1950s, but a seamless harmony between 
common law and statute law was taken 
for granted. Perhaps somebody should be 
trawling through the minutes of the 19th 
century Lunacy Commissioners to 
rediscover what robust common sense 
and wisdom might be overlooked in 
present practice! @
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European Law
Liberalisation of postal services in the EU
by Cameron McKenna, Brussels
The postal services sector is now 
emerging at the forefront of the evolution 
of EC competition law. European 
Commission proposals were due at the 
end of 1998 and, at the time of writing 
are expected imminently, for further 
liberalisation of the sector. This follows 
the existing internal market directive on 
postal services, Directive 97/67 on 
common rules for the development ot 
the internal market of Community- postal
services and the improvement of quality- 
of service (OJ 1998 L15/14). These 
proposals can be expected to set out a 
challenging time-scale for full 
liberalisation of the sector. The new 
measures will in any event result in 
incumbent monopoly operators facing 
competition in areas currently reserved 
to them. Directive 97/67 and the 
Commission's competition law decisions 
in the sector have all reflected a strong
o
concern to maintain a strict link between 
the quality of service provided and the 
proportionality of any restrictions of 
competition. The Commission is 
understood to have undertaken a series of 
studies as the basis for the further 
liberalisation proposals now due, with 
regard, inter alia, to cross-border mail, 
the weight and price thresholds and the 
clearance, sorting and transport of mail.
Europe's postal services sector is 
already becoming highly competitive, 
largely no doubt in anticipation of further 
liberalisation at EC level. The Dutch and 
German post offices, amongst the largest 
in Europe, have in particular pursued
active policies of acquiring courier, 
express delivery and parcel distribution 
services companies. The Dutch PTT has 
acquired TNT and Deutsche Post AG has 
made various acquisitions in the last two 
years. The UK Post Office has taken 
advantage of the relaxation of investment 
constraints on it by the UK government 
in late 1998 to acquire the parcel services 
company German Parcel Paket-Logistik 
GmbH, reportedly Germany's fourth 
largest such company (announced in 
January 1999).
The challenge for the incumbent 
public postal services operators ('PPOs') 
will be to expand their activities outside
their core geographical areas and coreo o r
services so as to achieve an overall gain in 
business through the proposed 
liberalisation. This comes at a time when 
electronic communications are already 
eroding the core letter business of PPOs
o
and putting pressure on their traditional 
revenues. The issues for the European 
Commission and the national regulatory 
authorities will be both to maintain the 
required levels of universal service and to 23
